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The current crisis has seen an 
increase in mortgage default rates 
unprecedented since the Great Depres-
sion. By the end of 2009, one out of 11 
mortgages was seriously delinquent or 
in foreclosure.1 In states that have been 
y the end of 2009, one out of every 11 
mortgages was seriously delinquent or 
in foreclosure. Economists have devoted 
considerable energy over the past several 
years to understanding the underlying causes of this 
increase in defaults. One goal is to provide a guide to 
dealing with the existing problems. In addition, a better 
understanding may help avoid future problems. In this 
article, Ronel Elul reviews recent research that has shed 
light on two areas: the extent to which securitization 
is responsible for the increase in default rates; and the 
relative contributions of negative equity, compared with 
“liquidity shocks,” in explaining mortgage default. 
hit hard by the collapse in housing, the 
figure is even higher: for example, one 
out of five in Nevada. Concerns about 
the effect of losses caused by mortgage 
defaults also led to the collapse of 
several large financial institutions. 
Economists have devoted con-
siderable energy over the past several 
years to understanding the underlying 
causes of this increase in default. One 
goal is to provide a guide to deal-
ing with the existing problems. For 
example, should troubled mortgages be 
modified and, if so, how? In addition, 
a better understanding may help avoid 
future problems. Recent research has 
shed light on two areas: the extent 
to which securitization is responsible 
for the increase in default rates; and 
the relative contributions of negative 
equity (that is, having a mortgage 
balance greater than the value of one’s 
house), compared with liquidity shocks 
(for example, job loss or expenses due 
to unforeseen illness) in explaining 
mortgage default. 
MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION
Many of the mortgages issued dur-
ing the boom were securitized. When 
mortgages are securitized, they are sold 
by the issuer to a trust (known as a 
special purpose vehicle, or SPV). The 
SPV issues securities that are backed 
by these mortgages, known as mort-
gage-backed securities (MBS). Mort-
gage securitization first began in 1970, 
in part to ease financing constraints 
that arose when the baby boom gen-
eration reached adulthood and began 
to purchase houses en masse.2 By 2006, 
nearly two-thirds of all mortgages 
originated were securitized.3
Traditionally, mortgages were 
securitized by the three government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs): Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.4 
In exchange for a fee, they guaranteed 
the mortgages in the pool against 
default. (This guarantee was explic-
1 “Seriously delinquent” mortgages are defined, 
in this case, as those mortgages that are 90 or 
more days delinquent, that is, that have missed 
three or more payments, without actually being 
in foreclosure. Many of these mortgages later 
end up in foreclosure. 
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2 See the book by Michael Fishman and Leon 
Kendall.
3 Source: Inside Mortgage Finance.
4 Ginnie Mae is part of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, while Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are private corporations 
(although, since September 2008, they have 
been under the conservatorship of the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency).Business Review  Q4  2010   13 www.philadelphiafed.org
itly backed by the U.S. government 
for mortgages securitized by Ginnie 
Mae, and it was widely believed by the 
market that mortgages securitized by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also 
implicitly government-backed.) 
However, beginning in the early 
2000s, the private securitization market 
began to expand. These loans were 
securitized without government back-
ing (either explicit or implicit). The 
MBS were issued by large financial 
institutions such as Lehman Brothers 
and Countrywide, although in many 
cases the loans themselves may have 
been originated by smaller nonbank 
mortgage lenders. Private securitization 
can be attractive to issuers for several 
reasons. First, GSEs were prohibited 
from guaranteeing mortgages with 
large balances (known as jumbo mort-
gages); this was particularly important 
in markets with high house prices, 
such as California. Also, the GSEs 
typically focused on safer loans, known 
as prime loans. By contrast, they were 
more reluctant to finance subprime 
mortgages made to riskier borrowers.5 
The private securitization market grew 
rapidly, making up over half of all 
securitization by 2005 (Figure 1).
When the mortgage market 
collapsed in mid-2007, these private 
securitized loans began defaulting at 
particularly high rates (Figure 2). The 
popular press laid blame on securiti-
zation for encouraging risky lending 
practices, and the financial reform bill 
passed in July 2010 requires securitizers 
to retain 5 percent of the assets they 
securitize. The underlying view of this 
reform is that underwriting practices 
would improve if the seller had more 
“skin in the game.” 
But how does securitization affect 
default rates? One possibility is that 
lenders securitized riskier loans and, 
in particular, that they took advantage 
of the fact that investors could not 
fully distinguish the loans’ risk. The 
other possibility is that securitized 
loans defaulted at higher rates because 
servicers6 were less likely to work with 
borrowers who got in trouble after 
the loans were originated — either 
because there was less incentive for 
them to do so, or because the structure 
of the securitization made it more dif-
ficult to do so. 
Private Securitized Loans Are 
Riskier. To see why securitized loans 
might be riskier when originated, it is 
useful to understand why banks secu-
ritize loans.7 One reason is regulatory 
arbitrage; that is, by securitizing loans, 
banks do not need to hold capital 
against them (which would be costly). 
Another reason is to obtain funding 
through bankruptcy-remote vehicles. 
That is, securitized loans are isolated 
from the broader risk of the issuer and 
would thus be unaffected should it 
default; this allows the bank to fund 
these investments more cheaply. One 
thing to note is that under both of 
these motivations, lenders would want 
5 There is no single definition of a subprime 
loan, but typically these were mortgages made 
to borrowers with low credit scores, for example, 
a FICO score below 660. In addition, a related 
category of loans, known as Alt-A, includes 
loans made to borrowers with good credit 
histories, but who are unable or unwilling to 
provide full documentation of their income or 
assets.  See the article by Christopher Mayer, 
Karen Pence, and Shane Sherlund for further 
discussion.
6 A servicer is an entity responsible for the 
day-to-day management of the mortgage loan, 
collecting payments, and transferring them to 
the lender or the investors in the security. Most 
important, they are also the ones who work out 
the details of modifications with borrowers. 
In some cases, the servicer actually owns the 
loans it is servicing, whereas, in other cases, 
the servicing is outsourced; this is the case for 
securitized loans, in particular. 
7 These and other motivations for securitiza-














Source: Inside Mortgage Finance14   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org 14   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
to securitize relatively safer loans, and 
therefore, this would not explain the 
higher default risk of securitized loans.8 
Two other reasons have been 
suggested for securitization, which 
are, in fact, consistent with the higher 
risk observed. The first is risk-sharing, 
or diversification. By selling loans 
through securitized pools, banks are 
able to diversify their balance sheets. 
This is especially important for banks 
that lend primarily in a single region, 
since it facilitates geographic diversi-
fication.  Note that according to this 
explanation, the risk of the loan would 
be priced appropriately; there is no 
presumption that the seller is taking 
advantage of the buyer. 
A final reason that has been sug-
gested is adverse selection, or cream-
skimming.  In this case, securitization 
would allow banks to lower their 
lending standards and make riskier 
loans — ones that they would have 
been less willing to make on these 
terms if they actually had to bear the 
full risk of the loan by holding it in 
portfolio. Moreover, given two loans 
that appear similar to investors, but 
which the bank could distinguish on 
the basis of its private information 
about the borrower, the bank would 
choose to securitize the one that is 
actually riskier. Private information 
that might be available to the lender, 
but not the investor, could include the 
existence of second liens that are not 
reported on the application (so-called 
silent seconds), or information about 
the borrower’s actual income in the 
case of no-documentation loans.
Atif Mian and Amir Sufi con-
firm that riskier loans were, in fact, 
securitized by using ZIP-code level data 
on subprime originations, defaults, and 
securitization rates. They show that 
those ZIP codes in which securitization 
was most prevalent were ones in which 
subprime lending rose the most and 
default rates subsequently increased 
most dramatically. One limitation of 
their work is that they use aggregate 
data, and so it is difficult to be sure of 
securitization's actual contribution. 
In particular, without detailed 
information on individual loans, it 
is not possible to determine whether 
investors could tell that these loans 
were riskier and so allow us to dis-
tinguish risk-sharing from adverse 
selection. That is, market participants 
on all sides may have been aware that 
these loans were risky, and securitiza-
tion simply facilitated sharing the risk 
of the loans. This is an important 
distinction, because if investors could 
not distinguish the true risk of the 
loans, it is possible that a market failure 
occurred, in that the amount of risky 
lending that took place was greater 
than was economically efficient.9
There Is Evidence of Adverse 
Selection. Benjamin Keys, Tanmoy 
Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikrant 
Vig wrote an influential study that 
uses loan-level data10 and concludes 
that adverse selection did indeed occur 
in the securitized loan market. They 
show, in particular, that those sub-
prime loans with low or no documen-
8 In the case of regulatory arbitrage, bank 
lenders would seek to economize on capital by 
retaining the riskiest loans and selling safer 
ones (which require the same amount of capital 
as riskier loans, but for which they can obtain 
the highest price on the market). Similarly, 
segregating assets from the risk of the overall 
firm makes sense when these assets are less risky 
than the average.
9 A classic discussion of the market failure 
induced by adverse selection can be found in 
Nobel Laureate George Akerlof’s model of the 
“market for lemons.”  
10 Their loan-level data set includes the status of 
each loan (current, 30 days delinquent, 60 days 
delinquent, etc.) as well as loan characteristics 
(interest rate, loan amount, etc.). By contrast, 
the aggregate data set used by Mian and Sufi 
contains only the average default rate and char-
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tation of income that were more likely 
to be securitized were also more likely 
to default. Keys and co-authors argue 
that low-documentation loans have 
more “soft” information that is not eas-
ily observable by investors and there-
fore provide more scope for cream-
skimming. On the other hand, they do 
not find evidence for cream-skimming 
for either prime mortgage loans (even 
with low documentation) or for those 
with full income documentation.
One difficulty with their analysis 
is that while their database contains 
loan-level data, all of the loans in the 
data set are securitized. This creates 
a problem. If all the loans in the data 
set are securitized, how can they even 
ask the question: Are securitized loans 
more likely to default than unsecuri-
tized loans? Also, what does it mean 
for a loan to be “more likely to be 
securitized”? 
Keys and co-authors come up 
with a clever approach. They argue 
that even in a sample of securitized 
loans, some of the loans were initially 
originated expressly with the end of 
securitization in mind, and others 
only more incidentally ended up as 
part of a package of securitized loans. 
They pose the question: Which loans 
(at origination) did the lender expect 
would be more likely to end up being 
securitized? They use the fact that 
private securitizations often required 
additional screening by the lender for 
loans to borrowers with FICO scores 
below 620, and so such loans are more 
"difficult" to securitize. Thus, lenders 
expect that there is a chance they may 
end up holding them. Now, all things 
being equal, the creditworthiness of a 
borrower with a score just above 620 
(say, 621) should be essentially the 
same as one with a score just below 
(say, 619), and, if anything, those with 
scores of 621 should be slightly less 
likely to default.11 However, Keys and 
co-authors show that, in their data 
set, the subprime loans with scores 
just above 620 are actually more likely 
to default than ones with scores just 
below 620. How can this be explained? 
They suggest that lenders anticipated 
that loans with scores below 620 would 
be more difficult to securitize and 
thus took more care in underwriting 
them (using information beyond that 
contained in the credit score). This, 
they argue, provides support for the 
negative effect of securitization on 
underwriting standards.
Ryan Bubb and Alex Kaufman 
argue, however, that this “620 cutoff” 
applied in all markets, both securitized 
and unsecuritized, and thus cannot 
be used to draw any conclusions about 
the role of securitization. In particular, 
they develop a model that shows that 
all lenders would use such a cutoff rule 
when it is costly to distinguish between 
safe and risky borrowers, regardless of 
whether the loan is expected to be se-
curitized.12 To support this conclusion, 
they then show that portfolio loans 
exhibit a similar jump in default rates 
when comparing loans with scores just 
below 620 to those with scores just 
above. This suggests that while lend-
ers may indeed use a 620 cutoff rule, 
they do so for both securitized and 
unsecuritized loans. So, they argue, 
such a rule cannot be used to identify 
those loans that are more difficult to 
securitize.13 
In my working paper, I address 
some of the difficulties in previous 
work. My paper uses loan-level data 
on both securitized and unsecuritized 
loans that cover two-thirds of the 
mortgage market during the period 
2004-2006.14 I show that private se-
curitized loans are indeed more likely 
to default than loans that are not 
securitized, and this is true for both 
low- and full-doc loans (although the 
effect is modestly stronger for low-
documentation loans). Moreover, I find 
that this effect is actually strongest in 
prime markets, unlike Keys and his 
co-authors, who, by construction, are 
restricted to examining only subprime 
loans with credit scores around 620.  
This may be because only in prime 
markets did lenders really have a 
choice of whether or not to securitize a 
loan, whereas nearly all subprime loans 
were securitized. In addition, investors 
in subprime securities may have been 
more attuned to the potential risks of 
such loans. To summarize, after exam-
ining a broader segment of the market 
than does the previous work, I find 
robust evidence that links securitiza-
tion and mortgage default.
Does Securitization Affect What 
Servicers Do to Avoid Foreclosure? 
In addition to a possible effect on 
lending standards, whether a loan is 
securitized may also affect the likeli-
hood that a lender or servicer modifies 
a troubled loan or otherwise engages in 
activities that reduce the likelihood of 
11 Since the relationship between credit scores 
and default risk is essentially continuous. 
12 That is, lenders will find that the benefits of 
investigating a borrower outweigh the costs only 
for those with low credit scores, since they are 
the likeliest to subsequently default.
13 Recently Keys and co-authors have circulated 
a paper that seeks to refute some of Bubb and 
Kaufman’s criticisms. In particular, they argue 
that Bubb and Kaufman’s results stem from their 
pooling of a wide variety of loans. Keys and 
co-authors provide two findings that support 
their original paper. The first is that if one uses 
Bubb and Kaufman’s data, but focuses solely on 
low-documentation subprime mortgages that 
were not insured by the GSEs, the securitiza-
tion rate drops for borrowers with FICO scores 
below 620. Also, the default rate for non-GSE-
securitized loans goes up as one moves from 
FICO scores just below 620 to scores just above. 
However, given the evidence in my study that 
securitized loans were riskier even in prime mar-
kets, this focus on loans with scores around 620 
seems too narrow.
14 Bubb and Kaufman use the same data set as I 
do in my working paper.16   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
foreclosure. There are several possible 
reasons why this might be the case. 
First, modifications and forbearance 
are costly for the servicer, since they 
take considerable time and expertise 
to successfully complete, and a servicer 
who does not own the loan will not ac-
crue the full benefit from a successful 
outcome, since it receives only a small 
percentage of the monthly payments. 
Also, securitization agreements may 
place limits on the number or types of 
loan modifications. Finally, changing 
these agreements typically requires the 
unanimous agreement of the investors, 
which is difficult, since the ownership 
base is usually very dispersed for these 
securitizations.15
Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, and 
Vikrant Vig find that, after becom-
ing seriously delinquent, loans held 
by banks (as opposed to those in 
securitized pools) are less likely to be 
foreclosed and more likely to resume 
making payments. This suggests that 
securitized loans are less likely to be 
renegotiated.  However, one diffi-
culty with Piskorski and co-authors’ 
analysis is that they cannot identify 
actual renegotiations and instead 
focus on whether the loans enter into 
foreclosure. This may be misleading; 
for example, some researchers have 
suggested another possible explanation 
for these findings: that banks may be 
delaying foreclosure on the loans they 
own simply in order to avoid writ-
ing down the loan, but they do not 
actually take any actions to effect a 
long-term cure.    
Two studies by Manuel Adelino, 
Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul Willen 
dispute the findings of Piskorski and 
his co-authors, although they use the 
same database. Rather than focusing 
on outcomes, as do Piskorski and his 
co-authors, Adelino, Gerardi, and 
Willen try to infer whether a loan 
was modified by finding those mort-
gages for which terms were changed. 
Significantly, they show that such 
modifications are very infrequent, 
occurring less than 3 percent of the 
time. Moreover, they show no signifi-
cant difference in modification rates 
between loans held in portfolio and 
those in securitized pools. They argue 
that this is because such modifications 
are generally not profitable for lenders, 
whether or not the loans are securi-
tized. The reason is that lenders take 
into account two costs to modifying 
a loan. The first is that modification 
may, in fact, not be necessary, in that 
the borrower would have continued 
paying the unmodified loan, with 
higher cash flow to the lender (Adeli-
no and co-authors term this self-cure 
risk). The other is that modification 
might not help, in that the borrower is 
in such distress that he defaults regard-
less of the modification, and thus, it 
is not worth expending resources to 
renegotiate (redefault risk).16
One limitation of their work, how-
ever, is that they are generally not able 
to verify that the loans were actually 
modified.17 Also, there may be other 
types of renegotiations that do not ac-
tually change loan terms and so would 
not be picked up by Adelino and his 
co-authors’ method for identifying re-
negotiated loans. One example would 
be forbearance and repayment plans, 
in which borrowers postpone payments 
for a number of periods and then make 
up the arrears. Finally, they are also 
not able to observe all of the factors 
that might explain when modifications 
succeed, such as a borrower's income 
or the existence of other liens.
Summing up, to properly evalu-
ate the effect of securitization on 
foreclosure-mitigation efforts, it would 
be desirable to have explicit data on 
loan modifications and other rene-
gotiations, as well as other pertinent 
information (in particular, information 
about lenders’ policies and more details 
on the borrower, such as income).
CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
ILLIQUIDITY AND NEGATIVE 
EQUITY TO EXPLAINING 
MORTGAGE DEFAULT
One striking feature of the current 
crisis is, of course, the sharp nation-
wide drop in house prices. Another 
unusual aspect is that defaults on 
mortgages rose more rapidly than those 
on other forms of consumer credit, 
such as credit cards, whereas in previ-
ous recessions quite the opposite was 
the case (Figure 3).  The crisis has thus 
led to heightened interest in a better 
understanding of the determinants of 
homeowners’ decision to default on 
their mortgages. In particular, are de-
faults driven by falling house prices or 
by “liquidity shocks” such as job losses?  
Or perhaps both are important.
In addition to the value of improv-
ing our theoretical understanding of 
mortgage default, there is also an im-
mediate policy motivation. One impor-
tant part of the government’s efforts to 
reduce foreclosures has been mortgage 
modifications that change loan terms. 
But should mortgage modifications 
focus more on increasing equity to 
give homeowners more of a stake or on 
reducing monthly payments to make 
them more affordable? Existing gov-
ernment programs now seem to reflect 
both possibilities. 
For example, when the Trea-
15 See the article by Piskorski, Seru, and Vig and 
also the studies by Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen 
for further discussion of the impediments to 
renegotiating mortgage contracts.
16 Note that Adelino and co-authors argue that 
lenders do not find it privately profitable to rene-
gotiate most loans.  This isn’t inconsistent with 
the possibility that loan modifications could be 
socially beneficial.
17 But they do test their algorithm on a database 
of loans that explicitly identifies modifications 
and find that it performs reasonably well in 
identifying actual modifications. Business Review  Q4  2010   17 www.philadelphiafed.org
sury’s Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP) was introduced in 
March 2009, it focused on adjusting 
monthly payments so that they do 
not exceed 31 percent of a borrower’s 
pretax monthly income (by lower-
ing interest rates or by extending the 
maturity). But recently the HAMP 
program was also expanded to encour-
age servicers to instead consider reduc-
ing the outstanding principal so that 
the loan-to-value ratio does not exceed 
115 percent. 
The traditional “option-theoretic” 
view of mortgage default provides a 
way to understand the effect of house 
prices on the mortgage default deci-
sion. According to this model, when 
homeowners make the monthly pay-
ments on their mortgage, they get two 
things. First, they get the benefit of 
continuing to live in the house for the 
current month.18 In addition, they have 
an “option” on any future appreciation 
in the value of the house. That is, they 
will profit if their house increases in 
value. According to this model, the 
key driver of default will be negative 
equity. That is, if the house is worth 
less than the mortgage, then, in the 
extreme case, the homeowner would 
be better off not paying the mortgage, 
giving up the house, and buying (or 
renting) a similar house for less. In 
a previous Business Review article, I 
provide further details on the option-
theoretic model of mortgage default 
and survey the earlier empirical work 
in this area. 
However, as I discuss, studies have 
also found that many households with 
negative equity do not immediately 
default. Furthermore, default is often 
associated with indicators of shocks 
such as high unemployment rates. 
According to the pure option-theoretic 
model, these should play no role; only 
a homeowner’s equity position should 
affect his default decision.
One way of reconciling the theory 
and the data is to first observe that 
default is costly,19 and so homeowners 
may prefer to wait before defaulting, to 
see if house prices recover. However, 
for someone who is very illiquid (that 
is, has little cash to spare for the 
mortgage payment and is unable to 
borrow), the cost of waiting for prices 
to recover may be very high, and he 
or she is likely to default on his or her 
mortgage sooner rather than later. 
Thus, a homeowner’s liquidity position 
has a role in the default decision as 
well.20
The Relative Roles of Negative 
Equity and Illiquidity. The empiri-
cal question remains: How important 
are negative equity and illiquidity in 
the default decision?  Because of data 
limitations, previous research had 
to use very indirect ways to identify 
which borrowers had suffered a liquid-
ity shock or were otherwise cash-con-
strained. For example, earlier studies 
used local unemployment rates to 
measure the likelihood that a borrower 
might have suffered an unemployment 
shock (see the study by Chester Foster 
and Robert Van Order). Or they iden-
tified characteristics of the mortgage at 
origination (for example, a low down 
payment) as evidence that the bor-
rower was already liquidity-constrained 
when taking out the mortgage (see the 
study by Patrick Bajari, Sean Chu, and 
18 This model is clearly idealized. For example, 
even if a homeowner does not pay his mortgage, 
he will not necessarily be forced to leave his 
home immediately, since the foreclosure process 
can take a long time, depending on the state in 
which the house is located (for example, over a 
year in New York). 
19 These costs can include limited access to 
future credit, moving costs, and even the 
psychological trauma of being thrown out of 
one’s home.
20 While the popular press often terms equity-
driven defaults “strategic” and contrasts them 
with “involuntary” defaults driven by factors 
such as job loss, my article suggests that such a 
sharp distinction is unwarranted.
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* Fraction of loans that are 60+ days delinquent. 
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Minjung Park). These studies typi-
cally find weak evidence for the role of 
liquidity. But it may be that imperfect 
measures of illiquidity used in previous 
research led to weak results. A further 
difficulty is that many of these liquid-
ity measures are taken at the state or 
county level. Since house prices are 
also typically measured at the state or 
MSA level, previous research found it 
difficult to empirically disentangle the 
effects of house prices and liquidity.  
In a 2010 study, my co-authors 
and I more directly assess the relative 
importance of these two factors for 
mortgage default. We combine loan-
level data on mortgage performance 
with information on credit card 
utilization rates from credit bureau files 
to obtain a sample of first mortgages 
originated in 2005 and 2006. The card 
utilization rate provides a direct way to 
measure a borrower’s liquidity position. 
All things being equal, a consumer 
who is using a larger fraction of his 
credit line is expected to be less liquid 
and hence more likely to default on his 
mortgage. Another way to understand 
why a high utilization rate is associated 
with increased default risk is that it 
may reflect shocks that the consumer 
has experienced in the past (for 
example, someone who has lost his job 
is likely to run up a large balance on 
his credit card). 
We find that both low levels of 
home equity (that is, a high loan-to-
value ratio, or LTV) and high card 
utilization rates are associated with 
increased default risk and have roughly 
similar magnitudes. Going from a 
loan-to-value ratio of below 50 percent 
to one just above 100 percent (that is, 
to negative equity) more than doubles 
the average default rate, from below 1 
percent to 2 percent. Similarly, going 
from a credit card utilization rate of 
below 50 percent to one above 80 per-
cent has approximately the same effect 
on default. 
FIGURE 4
Distribution of LTV and Utilization Rates*
1st Mortgage LTV Distribution
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To help assess the economic 
significance of these results, Figure 
4 shows the distribution of LTV and 
credit card utilization rates across the 
population; from these it is apparent 
that the fraction of the population 
with either high LTV or high 
utilization exceeds 10 percent. We also 
find evidence of an interaction between 
the two effects: The impact of high 
utilization is more pronounced when 
the loan-to-value ratio is also high. 
This makes sense, since when the 
loan-to-value is low, the homeowner 
would lose a lot of equity in the event 
of default. Such a homeowner will 
make every attempt to avoid default, 
even when cash on hand is very low.21 
CONCLUSION
Economists have learned about 
the impact of securitization on mort-
gage default. There is robust evidence 
that securitized loans were riskier, and 
this may have contributed to a general 
decline in lending standards, which led 
to the spike in default rates. My co-au-
thors and I have also shown that nega-
tive equity and liquidity shocks are of 
comparable importance in explaining 
mortgage default. Moreover, it is also 
now clear that one should not view 
each of these in isolation and that the 
sharp distinction between “strategic” 
and “involuntary” defaults often found 
in the popular press is misleading. 
However, to date, the literature 
is inconclusive about the effects of 
securitization on loan restructurings 
to cure default and, more generally, on 
which types of loan modifications are 
successful. There is also still more to 
learn about the extent to which inves-
tors understood the risks in securitized 
loans and on how consumers manage 
different types of credit. B R
21 We also find that the effect of utilization 
is less significant when the LTV is very high 
(above 120 percent); this may reflect the fact 
that when equity is very negative, the borrower 
will not find it worthwhile to keep his home 
even if he has ample liquidity.
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